We demonstrate that for any well-defined cryptographic protocol, the symbolic trace reachability problem in the presence of an Abelian group operator (e.g., multiplication) can be reduced to solvability of a decidable system of quadratic Diophantine equations. This result enables complete, fully automated formal analysis of protocols that employ primitives such as Diffie-Hellman exponentiation, multiplication, and xor, with a bounded number of role instances, but without imposing any bounds on the size of terms created by the attacker.
Introduction
Conventional formal analysis of cryptographic protocols relies on the so called "DolevYao" attacker model, which assumes that the attacker can intercept any message and construct or modify messages using a given set of computational and cryptographic primitives. Cryptographic operations are treated abstractly as black boxes, in the sense that they are assumed to have no computational features other than those associated with encryption and decryption. Black-box cryptographic primitives are characterized using simple axioms such as dec£ enc£ is the inverse key to¨, which might be either¨itself for symmetric encryption, or the corresponding private key for public-key encryption. Sometimes even less is assumed: for example, in the free algebra model dec is not used explicitly (the consequences of this restriction are discussed in [Mil03] ).
This rudimentary treatment of encryption is not adequate to deal with primitives such as xor (exclusive or), multiplication, and Diffie-Hellman exponentiation, which are widely used in security protocols. The attacker can and will exploit associativity, commutativity, cancellation, and other properties of these operations. For example, Bull's recursive authentication protocol was formally proved correct in a model that treated xor as an abstract encryption, and then found to be vulnerable once self-cancellation properties of xor are taken into account [Pau97, RS98] .
We use symbolic trace reachability as the standard representation of the protocol analysis problem for trace-based security properties, which include secrecy and most authentication properties. This problem has been shown to be undecidable in several general settings (for example, see [DLMS99] ). Our approach follows the line of research that makes the reachability problem decidable by bounding the number of sessions, but allowing an unbounded attacker who may create messages of arbitrary depth [AL00, FA01, Bor01, MS01] . Other model checking approaches require a priori bounds on message complexity or may fail to terminate. Inductive proof approaches have no finiteness limitations, but require substantially more human effort per protocol, and are still subject to undecidability results.
In symbolic approaches, messages are represented as terms in an algebra generated by abstract computational primitives. Messages may contain variables, representing data fields whose value is not known in advance to the recipient. A variable can be viewed as the attacker's input to the protocol execution since the attacker can instantiate it with any term available to him as long as the instantiation is consistent in every term where the variable appears.
A trace is a sequence of messages sent and received. A trace is reachable if there is a substitution that instantiates all variables with ground terms such that all messages sent by the honest parties are consistent with the protocol specification, and all messages received by the honest parties from the network could have been constructed by the attacker from the previously sent messages and attacker's initial knowledge.
A trace is an attack if it violates the security condition -in the case of secrecy, if a value that is supposed to remain secret appears in the trace as an unencrypted received message (i.e., is announced by the attacker). For a bounded number of sessions, the symbolic trace reachability problem has been shown to be NP-complete [RT01] , assuming a free term algebra.
Our main contribution is to extend the constraint solving approach, first proposed in [MS01] , to handle the algebraic properties of Abelian group operators. For any welldefined cryptographic protocol, we show that symbolic trace reachability is equivalent to solvability in integers of a certain system of quadratic equations. We then prove that this system is decidable. Decidability of the bounded-session protocol insecurity problem for xor (first shown in [CLS03, CKRT03b] ) and for the free attacker algebra without equational properties (previously proved in [RT01, CCM01, MS01]) follow as special cases.
Overview
In Section 2, we introduce our formal model and describe how to reduce the protocol analysis problem to a sequence of symbolic constraints. In Section 3, we posit the origination stability condition, which is a necessary property of any well-defined protocol. In Section 4, we summarize the theory of ground term derivability in the presence of an Abelian group operator, due to Comon-Lundh and Shmatikov [CLS03] .
The main technical result of the paper appears in Section 5. If the constraint sequence has a solution, we prove that it has a conservative solution. Intuitively, the conservative solution uses only the structure that is already present in the original sequence. We show that the substitution for any variable is a product of terms (and their inverses) drawn from a finite set: the non-variable subterms of the original constraint sequence. The resulting set of product derivation problems is naturally reduced to a system of quadratic Diophantine equations, as shown in Section 6. One of the steps along the way is Abelian group unification, which is known to be decidable [BS01] . We then proceed to demonstrate that the quadratic system has a solution if and only if a particular linear subsystem has a solution. Since linear Diophantine equations are decidable (e.g., [CD94] ), this establishes decidability of the protocol analysis problem in the presence of an Abelian group operator.
In Section 7, we extend our approach to protocols with Diffie-Hellman exponentiation, under the restriction that multiplication may appear only in exponents. We replace exponentials by a combination of products and uninterpreted functions, which reduces the symbolic analysis problem for such protocols to the solvability of a symbolic constraint sequence with an Abelian group operator. Conclusions are in Section 8.
Related work
Boreale and Buscemi [BB03] and Chevalier et al. [CKRT03a] recently developed decision procedures for protocol analysis in the presence of Diffie-Hellman exponentiation. Neither addresses decidability in the presence of an Abelian group operator. The decision procedure of [BB03] requires an a priori upper bound on the number of factors in each product, but the paper does not indicate how to compute this bound for a given symbolic trace. In general, establishing upper bounds on the size of variable instantiations needed for a feasible attack on a protocol is a highly non-trivial problem and one of the main challenges in proving decidability. Therefore, the technique of [BB03] cannot be considered a complete decision procedure even for protocols with Diffie-Hellman exponentiation.
Chevalier et al. [CKRT03a] proved that the insecurity problem for a restricted class of protocols is NP-complete in the presence of Diffie-Hellman exponentiation. They do not consider Abelian group operators outside exponents, and their result only applies to protocols in which no more than one new variable is introduced in each protocol message. Also, they do not permit variables to be instantiated with products. These restrictions are quite strong, ruling out some well-defined protocols. For example, a protocol in which an honest participant receives is not permitted by the syntactic restrictions of [CKRT03a] (this protocol may be rewritten so as to satisfy the restrictions, but it is not clear whether there exists a general-purpose syntactic transformation that converts any protocol into one satisfying the restrictions of [CKRT03a] ). In contrast, the results of this paper are directly applicable to any protocol which is well-defined in the following sense: an honest participant is not required to output the value of an attacker's variable before he has received any message containing that variable.
The technique of [CKRT03a] is more general in its treatment of Diffie-Hellman exponentiation since it allows exponentiation from an arbitrary base, while only constant-base exponentiation is considered in this paper. See [Shm04] for an extension of our constraint solving technique to modular exponentiation from an arbitrary base.
Pereira and Quisquater [PQ01] discovered an attack on a group Diffie-Hellman (GDH) protocol that exploits algebraic properties of Diffie-Hellman exponents. Their approach is specific to GDH-based protocols, and the attacker model is restricted correspondingly (e.g., the attacker is not even equipped with the ability to perform standard symmetric encryption). They do not attempt to address the general problem of deciding whether a term is derivable in an attacker algebra with the equational theory of multiplication, or whether a particular symbolic attack trace has a feasible instantiation. Since they only consider the problem in the ground case, the resulting system of equations is linear, whereas the system we obtain in the general case with variables is quadratic (see Section 6). An application of our approach to one of the Pereira-Quisquater examples is summarized in Section 7.
Recent research by Narendran et al. focuses on decidability of unification modulo the equational theory of multiplication and exponentiation [MN02, KNW02, KNW03] . While equational unification is an important subproblem in symbolic protocol analysis, unification alone is insufficient to decide whether a particular symbolic attack trace is feasible.
Decidability of symbolic protocol analysis in the presence of xor has been proved in [CKRT03b, CLS03] . Chevalier et al. [CKRT03b] showed that the problem is NPcomplete in a restricted protocol model which is very similar to the one proposed in this paper. Independently, Comon-Lundh and Shmatikov [CLS03] demonstrated decidability of symbolic protocol analysis with xor in the unrestricted model. This paper lifts the results of [CLS03] by considering the symbolic analysis problem in the presence of an arbitrary Abelian group operator, resulting in a substantially more complicated theory than in the xor case. In contrast, [CLS03] only considers Abelian group operators in the ground case, and obtains symbolic decidability results for xor only.
Bertolotti et al. [BDSV03] investigated cryptographic protocol analysis in the presence of associative and commutative operators. The algebraic theory considered in this paper is significantly more complicated. In protocols such as group Diffie-Hellman [STW96] , the exponents form an Abelian group. In particular, the attacker can easily compute multiplicative inverses. To discover attacks such as that found by Pereira and Quisquater [PQ01] , the algebraic theory must include inverses and cancellative reductions such as ¡ § £ ¢ ¥ ¤ . Demonstrating decidability in the presence of an Abelian group operator (rather than mere associativity and commutativity) is the main technical contribution of this paper.
Model
We begin with the strand space model of [THG99] . A strand is a sequence of nodes representing the activity of one party executing the protocol. Strands are finite and do not have branching or loops. Associated with each node is a message term with a sign, + or ¦ , indicating that the message is sent or received, respectively. Messages in a strand are ground terms in a suitable algebra.
A protocol specification is a set of roles for legitimate parties in the protocol. A role can be instantiated with different data in different protocol sessions. Hence, roles in a protocol are specified as strand schemas, in which message terms may contain variables. A role strand is a partially (or fully or un-) instantiated strand schema that is a role; a role instance is a fully instantiated (ground) role strand.
In the usual strand space model, there is a standard set of penetrator roles representing primitive computations that an attacker can perform. An attack on a protocol may involve many concurrent sessions or role instances woven together with penetrator strands. A bundle is a collection of (protocol and penetrator) role instances in which the source of each received message is identified. Thus, nodes in a bundle are partially ordered by their strand sequence and also by the connection of a send node to a receive node for the same message. Bundles are backward complete in the sense that the strand predecessor of each (non-initial) node must be present, and the send node for each receive node must be present. A bundle is essentially a Lamport diagram [Lam78] in which the processes are strands. (Lamport called this a space-time diagram, but others renamed it in the context of distributed systems.)
Overview of constraint solving
It is shown in [THG99] and elsewhere how security questions can be reduced to questions about the existence of a bundle that exhibits a security violation. In our constraint solving approach begun in [MS01] , bundle existence is determined by starting with a semibundle consisting of partially instantiated role instances, in which the sources of received messages are not necessarily determined. (The term "semibundle" comes from the Athena paper [Son99] .) In a semibundle to be analyzed, the number of instances of each role has been chosen, and variables representing nonces (or session keys) have been instantiated to symbolic constants in the roles that generate them. The remaining variables are, for purposes of analysis, viewed as chosen or constructed by the attacker.
As in Athena, search for a solution begins with a semibundle that has no penetrator strands. Athena adds penetrator strands and role strands as necessary to extend the semibundle until it is a complete bundle. We never add role strands, because we bound the number of roles to begin with to achieve decidability. We never add penetrator strands, because their purpose is modeled implicitly by derivation constraints. We solve the constraints to see if the original semibundle can be instantiated to the role strands of a bundle. Unlike Athena, we solve the problem in an infinite state space that includes all possible combinations of penetrator strands.
A different sequence of derivation constraints is generated for each possible trace. Derivation constraints assert that each received message is derivable, using attacker termgeneration rules, from messages that were previously sent in the trace. A solution instantiates variables in the semibundle so that ground terms representing received messages are all derivable. If the constraint sequence is not solvable for any of the possible traces, then an attack bundle does not exist for the given set of role strands (though one might exist for a larger set).
An efficient method for generating traces and solving a set of derivation constraints by applying rules for successive transformations of the constraint sequence is given in [MS01] . One important advance in that paper is the ability to handle non-atomic or constructed symmetric keys, that is, keys that may be the result of a combination of operations such as concatenation, encryption, and hashing. Some work was done subsequently to improve the efficiency of constraint generation and solving. Corin and Etalle devised an incremental approach [CE02] that has been adopted and incorporated into our own software tool. Recently, the AVISPA project made further improvements with a "constraint differentiation" approach [BMV03] . This paper focuses on the decidability of constraint solving in the extended model with Abelian group operations. The constraint solving step is different from that of [MS01] , and consists mainly in reducing the constraint solving problem to a choice among a finite selection of substitutions, followed by solving a system of simultaneous linear Diophantine equations.
The solution approach presented here is aimed only at establishing decidability. Analyzing complexity and finding an efficient way to carry out protocol analysis are left to future work. A practical algorithm similar to that of [MS01] may work by gradual discovery of the right set of substitutions by successive unifications, but unification would have to be performed modulo the equational theory of Abelian groups, followed by solving a system of linear Diophantine equations. Practical techniques for solving linear Diophantine equations have already been developed in the context of associative-commutative unification [LC89] .
Term algebra
To focus on decidability in the presence of an Abelian group operator, we use a simplified term algebra that includes only pairing, symmetric encryption (but not decryption), a one-argument function modeling a one-way hash function, and an Abelian group operator written as multiplication. There are also assumed to be an unlimited number of variables and free constants (zero-argument functions). This is almost a free algebra, that is, one with no valid equations between terms (other than identities). But our term algebra is not free because multiplication forms an Abelian group, with unit ¤ and a multiplicative inverse. The notation for these operations is shown in Fig. 1 .
As in prior work with free algebras, there is no explicit decryption operator. Decryption is performed implicitly by protocol participants. The attacker's ability to extract components of a pair, or to decrypt an encrypted term when he knows the decryption key is modeled by separate attacker inference rules, which are discussed in Section 2.4.
The overall algebraic structure is described as the disjoint combination of a free theory and the Abelian group theory, following [SS89] . In this context, "disjoint" means that each relation involves only functions (and constants) from one theory at a time, in this case the group theory. However, any term is acceptable as an argument to any function. One way of viewing this is that all terms are untyped (or share a common base type, or sort). In particular, we do not distinguish between keys and other kinds of messages.
Actual cryptographic operators do have requirements on their arguments, at least on their size in bits, and in many cases more subtle restrictions. Protocol implementations depend on observing these restrictions. For example, our algebra would allow a term like
, but a protocol would normally have to apply a type coercion operator (a hash or truncation, perhaps) to ¦ § before it could be used as a key. Moreover, when the Abelian group operator is applied to a compound term (e.g., a pair), in the actual implementation the corresponding bitstring must be interpreted as an element of the right group, which may or may not be possible. We trust the protocol specification in this respect. If terms appearing in the abstract protocol specification involve application of the Abelian group operator to compound terms, we assume that such terms can be mapped into the group. Nevertheless, due to our abstract treatment of cryptographic functions, our analysis may generate unimplementable attacks, e.g., those involving application of the Abelian group operator to ciphertexts encrypted with a symmetric key, etc. These spurious attacks can be recognized by static inspection and discarded.
It is natural to ask here about the relationship between ground terms in our term algebra and the bitstrings they are mapped to in the protocol implementation. This is not an easy question to answer because of the level of abstraction of our model (and all Dolev-Yaostyle [DY83] models in general). For example, regarding encryption as a free operator means that the infinite sequence of terms
are all distinct, whereas in practice the bitstring values would all have the same length and could not all be distinct. Thus, there are additional relations in reality, and this implies that there may be more attacks on the real protocol than on the abstract version. Such concerns are addressed in work on computationally sound formal models, which is beyond the scope of this paper. The Abadi-Rogaway paper [AR02] is a good introduction to this issue.
Additional relations may also come about because of particular ways that encryption is performed. Encryption can be accomplished using exponentiation or multiplication, for example, and some interaction with the multiplicative Abelian group operator could occur, especially if they both use modular arithmetic. Such design choices might lead to attacks that would not be discovered in the present model. However, our decision procedure will determine the existence of any attack strategies that work uniformly, that is, for all possible cryptographic implementations that satisfy the abstract axioms.
We describe a specific extension with exponentials in Section 7, for application to pro- 
Unification
There is a unification algorithm that can be applied to any two terms and ¢ constructed using the syntax of Fig. 1 , by combining conventional structural unification on the free operators and Abelian Group (AG-) unification modulo associativity and commutativity of the operator and normalization rules of Fig. 2 . If both terms to be unified are not products, 
Attacker model
We use the standard attacker model augmented with rules concerning products and inverses (an extension to exponentials can be found in Section 7). The attacker's ability to derive terms is characterized as a term closure under the inference rules of Fig. 3 . The sequent § ¡ £ means that £ is derivable (computable) from the terms in the set . The term closure of is the set of all terms derivable from (including members of ).
Constraint generation
Suppose we are given a protocol specified as a set of roles (strand schemas). We first choose a finite set of role strands for the semibundle. (There is no algorithm to determine how many of each are needed.) Each role may be instantiated zero or more times. In each role strand, any nonce variable generated by that role is instantiated with a distinct symbolic constant.
As an example, consider the protocol with two roles
No variables remaining in a semibundle should occur in more than one strand. Even though role specifications may use the same variable like or in different roles because the value is expected to be the same, there is no guarantee that corresponding variables will be instantiated with the same value during execution.
We generate all possible node orderings, or traces, that are consistent with the given strands. This is a finite set that grows exponentially with the number of strands. (Some traces can be discarded safely, but for proving decidability we may as well assume that we have all of them.) Each trace yields a sequence of derivation constraints.
In general, if 
£
and messages in may contain variables. We assume that contains terms that are initially known to the attacker, such as constants specific to the protocol and the attacker's own long-term keys. It is usually not necessary to include the constant ¤ , since if contains any term , the attacker can derive ¤ as . The properties of protocol-generated sequences are discussed in Section 3. Our example semibundle has traces corresponding to all node orderings that respect the ordering of nodes 2 and 3. Note also that the only traces of interest are attacks, which end with node 4. Thus, the complete set of orderings to examine is 1234, 124, 14, 2134, 2314, 214, 24, 4. (One can show that it is sufficient to examine 1234 and 14, since any attack possible with a different ordering is possible with one of these.) The ordering 1234 generates the constraint sequence 
Subterms and product closures
We introduce a few definitions for convenience. If is a finite set of terms, let ¢ ¤ £ £ be the set of subterms of , which is the least set of terms such that:
. We say that is a superterm of is the closure of this set under product ( ) and inverse.
Well-Defined Protocols and Constraint Sequences
We start by defining two properties of constraint sequences that are essential for establishing decidability: monotonicity and origination. Conceptually, these properties are similar to those defined for the constraint solving method of [MS01] . Informally, monotonicity means that the attacker's knowledge never decreases as the protocol progresses: all messages intercepted by the attacker are simply added to the set of terms available to him. Origination means that each variable appears for the first time in some message generated by the attacker (recall that in the symbolic analysis approach, variables model attacker's input to the protocol execution).
Our proof of decidability requires that monotonicity and origination be preserved by any partial substitution (this is a technical difference from [MS01] ). In this section, we argue that this is true for any symbolic constraint sequence associated with a well-defined protocol. Our notion of well-definedness is formalized below, but it can be informally understood as follows. For any choice of attacker's inputs to the protocol execution, the protocol should never require an honest participant to generate a message containing an attacker's input before the attacker sent any message with that input.
Although a constraint sequence must be solved by a ground substitution, the substititions we work with below are not always ground substitutions. We do assume, for convenience, that all substitutions are idempotent. An idempotent substitution eliminates every variable it instantiates. That is, if we define the domain 
Monotonicity and origination
be any constraint sequence generated from a protocol. This property means that the attacker does not "forget" terms. As the protocol progresses, the set of the terms available to the attacker does not decrease. The constraint generation procedure described in Section 2.5 produces monotonic constraint sequences. Furthermore, this property is preserved by substitutions.
To understand the origination property, recall that variables represent the attacker's input to the protocol execution. Therefore, each variable must appear for the first time in some message generated by the attacker, i.e., in some message received by an honest party. , we would have¨¢ ¢ , which is impossible. In order to ensure this property for the initial constraint sequence generated from a protocol specification, we observe two conventions. First, nonces generated by a role are instantiated with new symbolic constants in that role. This ensures (in a free constant context) that all nonces are different. Second, we require that any other variables chosen by a role, such as the choice of responder principal made by an initiator, and the choice of initiator as well, are either instantiated with constants (for the strand containing a shared secret), or are placed in a prior received message, as if the attacker chose these values. This is artificial, but it makes sense for analysis, since we want to find attacks in which these values are chosen in a worst-case way, and we may as well assume that the attacker has chosen them.
For example, the one-message protocol
would have an additional message 
Well-defined protocols
For subsequent results, we need the property that origination is preserved by substitutions. This property will follow from a condition, defined below, called well-definedness, which is intuitively equivalent to requiring that honest participants make no undetermined choices. If a protocol is presented in a way that allows an undetermined choice, we want to analyze the protocol as though the attacker made the choice.
To explain our notion of an ill-defined protocol, suppose a protocol specification requires an honest participant to receive 
¢
. In this example, the protocol is not implementable as specified, since there is no way for the honest participant to determine which value of ¢ the attacker had in mind. We stress that non-implementability of this protocol is unrelated to hardness of factorization. Even if ¤ ¢ had unique factorization and the honest participant had unlimited computational power, he would still have no way of determining which of the two factors was chosen by the attacker as ¤ (because is commutative, values of ¤ and ¢ are completely symmetric). In this case, the honest participant has to make an undetermined choice between two candidates, which means that the protocol cannot be implemented as specified.
In contrast, suppose a protocol specification requires an honest participant to receive . This protocol is well-defined. The ability of an honest participant to compute the messages he is required to send by the protocol specification is no different in principle from the ability of the attacker to compute the messages received by honest participants (although honest participants may have access to term generation rules other than those of Fig. 3 ). The honest participants' computations required by the protocol are, roughly, the mirror image of the attacker's computations. Thus, if a constraint sequence " is generated from a trace of a well-defined protocol, each attacker term set .) This observation will lead us to the formal definition of well-definedness below.
We start by definining the honest participants' knowledge at each step of the symbolic protocol trace. Each is a set of terms. Even though there may be more than one honest participant, we combine all honest participants' knowledge into one set, because this is sufficient for our purpose. 
Note that
¢ ¡
does not contain any terms with variables with them. The reason for this is the origination property, which requires that every variable must appear for the first time in some message sent by the attacker, and no messages had been sent before the protocol started.
Consider the computation that the honest participants must execute according to the protocol specification. In a sense, it is the mirror image of the attacker computation. Recall that each constraint Informally, a protocol is well-defined if it does not require honest participants to output a message containing a variable that they have never observed before. Moreover, this condition must hold for any value of variables. Since variables are controlled by the attacker and represent the attacker's input to the protocol execution, the protocol must be well-defined for any choice of these values. Intuitively, this means that a participant's behavior in the protocol must be well-defined regardless of how other participants choose their nonces, what they send in lieu of ciphertexts encrypted by unknown keys, and so on. . We argue that any protocol that does not force honest participants to make undetermined choices satisfies Definition 3.5. Otherwise, the behavior of some honest participant is not defined for some values of attacker's inputs. For those values, the honest participant is expected to output the value of an attacker's variable before the attacker has sent any messages containing that value.
If a protocol designer wishes to check whether his protocol specification is well-defined, Definition 3.5 may be difficult to verify to practice because, for each constraint sequence generated from the protocol specification, it quantifies over all possible substitutions. In appendix A, we explain how to check whether a constraint sequence satisfies Definition 3.5 by considering only a finite number of substitutions (namely, those that may lead to cancellation of variables in the knowledge of honest participants).
We now prove a simple auxiliary lemma that will help demonstrate stability of origination under any partial substitution. . This completes the induction. 
Stability of monotonicity and origination
This section contains the results which are used in the rest of the paper. 
Ground Derivability
In this section, we outline the theory of ground term derivability in the attacker model with an Abelian group operator due to Comon-Lundh and Shmatikov [CLS03] . We only state the key lemmas. Proofs can be found in [CLS03] . Note that in [CLS03] , Abelian groups were considered only in the ground case. In contrast, this paper is devoted to solving the problem in the symbolic case. The normalization property stated in Lemma 4.5 may appear superficially similar to the analysis-followed-by-synthesis closure previously established for the free attacker algebra [Pau98, CJM00] . Normalization results of [Pau98, CJM00] do not apply, however, to attacker models with non-atomic encryption keys and equational theories with cancellation, requiring development of a new proof normalization theory such as [CLS03] . For example,
by any sequence in which analysis steps are followed only by synthesis steps. . . .
Proof: This lemma was proved in [CLS03] . 
Conservative Solutions
We will use the ground derivability results of [CLS03] as summarized in Section 4 to reason about solutions of symbolic constraint sequences. Our main insight is that, assuming the symbolic constraint sequence " is generated from a well-defined protocol and has a solution, there exists a conservative solution that uses only the structure already present in 
, and, since the induction hypothesis holds for 0 . In our choice of 0 , we use ¤ as the replacement for any subterm whose structure was not already present in the original constraint sequence. This choice is arbitrary. In fact, any value computable by the attacker would work just as well. The essence of our argument in the rest of this section is that if there exists some attack (i.e., some instantiation of variables that makes the symbolic trace feasible), then there is an equivalent attack which can be constructed without using these terms at all. Therefore, it does not matter what these subterms are replaced with, as long as the replacement value can be feasibly computed by the attacker. 
Decision Procedure for Symbolic Constraints
In this section, we present a decision procedure for symbolic constraint sequences associated with well-defined protocols. The essence of our decidability result is the proof that for each symbolic constraint sequence " , there exists a finite number of systems of simultaneous Diophantine equations such that (i) each system is decidable, and (ii) " has a solution if and only if at least one of the systems has a solution in integers. We emphasize that our goal is a theoretical decidability result. Therefore, we are concerned only with showing finiteness of our procedure and decidability of a particular class of Diophantine equations. In future work, we plan to investigate an efficient constraint solving procedure based on [MS01] that can be applied to practical protocol analysis.
Our decision procedure starts with two finite, nondeterministic steps Following Theorem 5.9, we limit our attention to conservative solutions. Our decision procedure consists in the following steps:
1. Guess subterm equalities.
2. For each constraint, guess all subterms derivable from the set of terms available to the attacker, and add them to this set.
Remove all constraints in which the derivation involves inference rules other than (M) or (I).
4. Substitute all target terms that introduce new variables.
5. For each of the resulting sequences, solve a system of linear Diophantine equations to determine whether the sequence has a solution or not.
Running example. We will use the following symbolic trace as an (artificial) running example to illustrate our decision procedure. An event ¦ ¢ is a node in an -role strand, etc. . As we argue below, there are only finitely many possibilities to consider, and one of them is the right one. Of course, we don't know 1 beforehand. Therefore, to discover which equivalence relation is the right one, we will need to enumerate all possible relations and perform the remaining steps of the decision procedure for each one to determine whether it leads to a solvable sequence. If " does not have a solution, it will not matter which equivalence relation we choose, since none of them will lead to a solvable sequence.
Determine subterm equalities
More precisely, for all . In the resulting constraint sequence, every constraint is solved either by application of a single inference rule, or the derivation involves only rules (M) and (I). In the former case, we can discover the right rule by syntactic inspection. In the latter case, only multiplicative operations are used, and we will convert the constraint solving problem into a system of simultaneous Diophantine equations.
Since we don't know . We conclude that 1 3 "
. By Lemma 6.1, this implies that there exists a solution . The proofs for (P) and (F) are similar.
¡
Running example. In our running example, we guess that no subterms (other than those already appearing as target terms) are derivable. Therefore, after removing duplicated constraints from
Eliminate all inferences other than (M) or (I)
In the third step ¢ § , we eliminate all constraints which can be satisfied by a single application of an inference rule other than (M) or (I). This step is deterministic. Lemma 6.8 implies that all such constraints can be found by syntactic inspection. Let " § be the resulting constraint sequence.
In the following lemma, we use 
Derive a system of quadratic Diophantine equations
In the last step of the constraint solving procedure, we convert each constraint sequence " £ into a system of quadratic Diophantine equations which is solvable if and only if . The system of the latter two equations is equivalent to the first. Hence the solvability of systems of quadratic Diophantine equations is also undecidable.
To solve the protocol analysis problem, we generate a system of quadratic Diophantine equations. In our case, we can demonstrate that the system we get is solvable if and only if a particular linear subsystem is solvable. Luckily, solvability of systems of linear Diophantine equations is decidable (see, e.g., [CD94] ). This problem is equivalent to solving an integer linear programming problem, which is known to be intractable in general, but there are efficient solution techniques that work well most of the time (just as the simplex method works well for real linear programming).
The key to this result is Lemma 6.19. Intuitively, we prove that, for every constraint $ £ 6 " £ , the target term
£1
must be equal to some product of integer powers of non-variable terms appearing in set . We then simply represent each power as an integer variable, and convert the constraint satisfaction problem for each constraint into a system of linear Diophantine equations.
There is a complication along the way. In addition to the linear system corresponding to the solvability of a given $ £ constraint, the integer variables in question must also satisfy a special system of quadratic equations. We show that this quadratic system always has a solution. Therefore, only the linear system needs to be solved to determine whether the constraint is satisfiable. Any solution of the linear system will automatically satisfy the quadratic system. Before we begin the proof, it is helpful to give a small example that gives some insight into how the exponents are computed.
Consider the constraints , we obtain
This completes the induction. 
Recall that
be the set of all factors appearing in equations (6). Since¨3 
Extension to Group Diffie-Hellman
In this section, we extend the constraint solving approach developed in Section 6 to protocols such as group Diffie-Hellman (GDH) [STW96] . Our extension, however, applies only in a restricted setting. We assume that the Abelian group (multiplication) operator appears only in the exponents. In particular, exponentials are not multiplied with each other, i.e., terms such as
do not appear in the protocol specification, nor is the attacker permitted to multiply exponentials. This restriction is necessary to preserve decidability, since it has been shown that unification (and, therefore, the symbolic analysis problem) is undecidable in the presence of equational theories for both Abelian groups and exponentiation [KNW02, KNW03] . This does not affect our ability to analyze protocols such as GDH since they satisfy the restriction (a similar restriction is adopted by [PQ01] ). In this paper, we consider only protocols in which all exponentiation is ultimately from a constant base, that is, the normal form of every exponential ground term is ), the only way the attacker can compute the needed exponential & is to take one (and no more than one!) of the exponentials at his disposal, i.e., some ¨ ( at least one such term is available, since is the publicly known base) and raise it to a power such that 
Pereira-Quisquater example
In [PQ01], Pereira and Quisquater find an attack against key authentication in an authenticated group Diffie-Hellman (A-GDH.2) protocol of [STW96] . In this section, we sketch how to discover this attack using our approach.
The attack involves two key distribution sessions. The first session has four parties, one of which is compromised. The second session occurs among three of those parties after the compromised party has been removed from the group. The attacker, who knows the secret shared keys of the compromised party, causes one of the legitimate parties to accept a non-authentic, compromised key in the second session.
In a decidable finite-session context, the analyst chooses how many strands of each role to put in the semibundle. In this example, involving a four-party group of ¦ ¡ ¦ ¡ § and £ , it is sufficient to choose two instances of role and one of £ . The behavior of is ignored (it does not matter for the purposes of discovering the attack), is the party being attacked, and § is the compromised party, whose role is taken over by the attacker. The object of the protocol is to construct a group key of the form ¢ ¥ where is a constant and the ¤ are secret random contributions from the group members. In the second session, the group key should be 
Conclusions
We have presented a constraint solving technique that reduces the problem of symbolic protocol analysis in the presence of an Abelian group operator to a finite set of systems of quadratic Diophantine equations. Each system has a solution if and only if a certain linear subsystem has a solution. Since linear Diophantine equations are decidable, the problem of symbolic protocol analysis with Abelian groups is thus decidable. The significance of this result is that it enables fully automated formal analysis of a wide class of protocols that cannot be analyzed in a free-algebra model. Results presented in this paper are but the first step towards reducing the gap between formal methods and mathematical proofs typically employed in cryptographic analysis of security protocols. Even though we take into account some mathematical properties of the underlying cryptographic primitives, we are still analyzing an abstract model, and thus possibly missing attacks due to our idealized treatment of cryptography. It would be interesting to know whether the results of this paper, especially the existence of conservative solutions, can be extended to algebraic theories other than Abelian groups, or to richer equational theories that more accurately represent properties of the relevant cryptographic functions. At the same time, recent undecidability results for equational unification [KNW02, KNW03] suggest that the symbolic constraint solving problem is undecidable in the presence of rich equational theories. Therefore, it is very likely that symbolic analysis can be fully automated only for abstract protocol models, or for protocols that employ cryptographic primitives without visible mathematical properties.
